The Applicability of Laches to State Medical Boards
Introduction
Occasionally investigations by state boards1 take longer than desired. Sometimes complainants take months or even years to file a complaint with a medical board. Cases may be complex and finding witnesses and obtaining expert opinions can lengthen the time it takes to complete a case. Sometimes the medical board must wait for another entity to complete its criminal investigations before the board can begin an investigation or bring charges. A delay, however, may prejudice a physician's ability to defend against the charges. This installment of Legal Briefs looks at the doctrine of laches (pronounced “latches”) and its applicability to state boards, as well as alternatives to laches.
First, what exactly is laches? In legal terms, it is the concept of unreasonable delay in pursuing a right or claim — in a way that prejudices the opposing party. When asserted in litigation, it is in the category of “an equitable defense” or “doctrine.” The person invoking laches asserts that an opposing party has “slept on its rights,” and that during the elapsed time period, circumstances have changed and a plaintiff's original claim should not be granted.
The courts have five methods for handling cases that have become stale in this way. The first is to apply any applicable statute of limitation. The second is to apply the Due Process clause in the U.S. Constitution. The third is to distinguish precatory suggestions from mandatory requirements. The fourth is to use the equitable remedy of estoppel. The fifth is to use the doctrine of laches. After reviewing the first four, this article will focus on the doctrine of laches. While reviewing laches, it must be remembered that the purpose of a medical board's administrative proceeding is not disciplinary but public protection.2
Statutes of Limitation
Brown v. State Personnel Board established that statutes of limitation, “like the equitable doctrine of laches, in their conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”3
Nevertheless, Lindsey v. Miller's Lessee concluded that “[i]t is a well settled principle that the statute of limitations does not run against a state.”4 Specifically, “It has been held that there are no statutes of limitation applicable to [professional] disciplinary proceedings.”5
Courts, however, may apply a statute of limitation to administrative proceedings.6 Sahu v. Iowa Board of Medical Examiners concluded that “if an administrative proceeding is in the public interest, such as disciplinary proceedings against a medical professional, courts will not apply the general statute of limitations.”7 Therefore, “courts have held without exception that in the absence of a statute which applies specifically to medical license revocation proceedings, statutes of limitations do not apply to such disciplinary proceedings.”8
Due Process
It is a well-established proposition that procedural due process requires notice and the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.9 Due process applies when the government seeks to deny a person of a property or liberty interest.10 Physicians have a property interest in their license. Therefore, due process applies to disciplinary proceedings. As one court stated, “[i]t is fundamentally unfair to make a physician defend a nine-year-old complaint when the complaint was not delayed by fraud or the lack of ability to discover the misconduct. To hold otherwise would be to hold that there is no constitutional outer time limit, and we will not do that. Due process is the New Hampshire Constitution's version of the principles of equity, and application of a laches-type doctrine is deemed a part of the process due a person whose economic life and professional career are on the line.”11
Precatory or Mandatory Language
Precatory language in statutes and regulations is merely a set of recommendations. Precatory language does not create an imperative obligation. Mandatory language in a statute or regulation establishes a duty that the agency must follow. Generally, if the statute does not contain a consequence for the agency's failure to act, then the statute is precatory. If the statute does contain a repercussion for failure to act, then the statute is mandatory.12
One court concluded that a legislature, in implementing timeframes, could not have meant for the state to lose jurisdiction.13 Here as elsewhere the public policy of public protection predominates over an individual's desire for a quick resolution.
Lake Havasu City v. Arizona Dept. of Health Services established that “uses of the word ‘shall’ in statutes and rules does not mean the language is mandatory because such a construction would undermine the authority of the government.”14 In holding that the secretary of labor, who failed to investigate a claim within a statutory timeframe, did not bar him from continuing with the case, the Supreme Court provided several factors for determining when timeframes divest agencies from acting outside a legislative timeframe. These are legislative history, the statutory consequences for failure to act within the period and the availability of less drastic remedy.15
Thus, as established in Sierra Pacific Industries v. Lyng, “[a] statutory time limit is not mandatory unless it both expressly requires an agency or public official to act within a particular period and specifies a consequence for failure to comply with the provision.”16 Nonetheless, even if the language is precatory, laches may still apply.
Estoppel
Equitable estoppel is used when a party seeks to enforce a right or perform a duty after the other party has relied upon the inaction. Equitable estoppel requires proof of reliance upon another's conduct to one's detriment.17 Brown v. State Personnel Board found that “The policy to expedite justice underlying the rule exists where the proceeding is before a local administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial functions such as the board… Thus, the administrative agency must diligently pursue the disciplinary action as if it were seeking equitable relief. In measuring diligence the courts will apply notions of laches borrowed from the civil law.”18 Estoppel is very similar to laches; however, laches is the better method for analyzing stale claims. Equitable estoppel focuses on detrimental reliance, while laches focuses on delay and prejudice.
Laches
Laches is an “equitable doctrine premised on unreasonable delay in asserting a right, which causes disadvantage or prejudice to another.”19 Laches cannot be inferred by the passage of time alone. It must be determined from all of the circumstances of the case, one of which must be the existence of harm caused by the delay. According to Bash v. Board of Medical Practice, “The party asserting laches bears the burden of proving both that the delay was unreasonable and that prejudice resulted from the delay.”20
In the administrative law arena, statutes of limitation do not apply, and it is not clear if the doctrine of laches applies. On the one hand, “[laches] has been made applicable to quasi-adjudicative proceedings as a common law policy pursuant to the inherent power of the courts.”21 On the other hand, as in State v. Josefsberg, “the contrary has been held, by the weight of authority, the defense of laches is not available against the government, state or national, in a suit by it to enforce a public right or to protect a public interest…”22
If laches applies, the public may be exposed to harm because the board would be stopped from proceeding with the case. If laches does not apply, however, a physician may have to defend against charges that are many years old. In calculating the time to apply to laches, the party must look at both the time it took for the complainant to complain and the time it took for the agency to act upon the complaint.23
Delay
The first element in demonstrating laches applies is unreasonable delay. What makes the delay unreasonable in the case of laches is that it results in prejudice.24 As noted in Brown v. State Personnel Board: “It is said, ‘[t]here is no fixed rule as to the circumstances that must exist or as to the period of time which must elapse before the doctrine of laches can be appropriately applied.’”25 Ordinarily delay alone does not constitute laches. “Thus ‘[d]elay is not a bar unless it works to the disadvantage or prejudice of other parties.’”26
In Stebbins, the court rejected an insurance salesman's argument that he was denied a “speedy trial” because of a 10-month delay while the State Insurance Commission investigated a complaint against him before filing a charge.27 The court agreed that the investigation could have been conducted more expeditiously. As noted in Caldwell v. State Bar: “However, petitioner has cited no cases, nor have we found any, which invalidate an administrative decision solely on the ground that there was a period of unreasonable delay during an agency investigation that preceded the initiation of formal proceedings.”28
However, the courts, using their inherent authority, have applied laches to quasi-judicial administrative actions.29 Therefore, the delay must be unreasonable, but delay by itself is not sufficient to apply laches to an agency action or inaction.
Prejudice
The second element in demonstrating that laches applies is prejudice because of the delay. Prejudice “cannot be inferred merely from the passage of time.”30 As established in Brown v. State Personnel Board: “Because of the relationship between prejudice and delay, the circumstances which give rise to laches vary widely depending upon their interplay in the specific case.”31 Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center viewed it this way: “Prejudice is never presumed; rather it must be affirmatively demonstrated by the defendant in order to sustain his burdens of proof and the production of evidence on the issue.”32
Excuse
Excuse is a defense against a laches claim. Occasionally a state agency may have a compelling excuse as to why a significant amount of time elapsed between receiving the complaint and filing charges. Brown v. State Personnel Board found that “In order to excuse delay, [the responsible party] must show exceptional circumstances prevented earlier action.”33 In Sahu, “the Board properly delayed filing the complaint during the pendency of the federal criminal charges, the disciplinary proceeding was commenced within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the criminal trial.”34 Therefore, excuse provides a valid response to a laches claim.
Agency Mistake
Agency mistake may excuse delay. Fahmy v. Medical Board of California noted: “It is matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do not run against the State. That no laches can be imputed to the king, and that no time can bar his rights, was the maxim of the common law, and was founded on the principle of public policy, that as he was occupied with the cares of government he ought not to suffer from the negligence of his officers and servants.”35
The principle applies to state and national governments, which necessarily act through its agents to preserve the public's interests.36 U.S. v. Nashville stated: “It is settled beyond doubt or controversy, upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy…which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided…”37
Lake Havasu City v. Arizona Department of Health Services established that “The United States Supreme Court [held] that there is and must be a strong public policy against allowing the mistakes of an agency or employee to limit the government's ability to enforce its laws.”38 And Brock v. Pierce County noted “We would be most reluctant to conclude that every failure of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action, especially when important public rights are at stake.”39
Sovereign Authority and Strong State Interest in Public Protection
The government acts within its sovereign authority when it acts to protect the public. Galang v. State Medical Examining Board concluded: “It is well established that the objectives of professional discipline include the rehabilitation of the licensee, the protection of the public, and deterrence to other licensees from engaging in similar conduct.”40 Thus, when the state regulates the medical profession, it is acting in its sovereign capacity and for the public good.41
When acting in its sovereign capacity, laches is not a defense. The court has noted the general principle of laches on the part of the government in bringing suit is not to be a defense in the case of a claim which is founded on a sovereign right and held that since this action was brought by the state in its sovereign capacity to protect a public right, the doctrine of laches was not available.42 These are all within the states' sovereign authority to protect the public. Thus, a medical board's disciplinary proceeding should not be barred by laches.
Even when, as noted in Webb v. West Virginia Board of Medicine, “there [are] circumstances in a physician discipline proceeding when…a substantial degree of prejudice to a physician that is caused by an unreasonable delay not of the physician's making might nevertheless be outweighed by the strong interests of the state, the public and the profession in fully addressing allegations of serious professional misconduct — so as to tip the equitable balance in favor of continuing with a proceeding.”43
Fahmy v. Medical Board of California concluded: “There is without a doubt a realization on the part of the Legislature that administrative agencies such as the Medical Board take action for the public welfare rather than for their own financial gain, and should not be hampered by time limits in the execution of their duty to take protective remedial action. That is particularly true in the case of the Medical Board, which is charged with protecting the lives and health of the citizenry from incompetent or grossly negligent medical practitioners. It is apparent that the Legislature wishes to have the Board protect California patients from physicians who are incapable of providing appropriate services in life or death situations, regardless of how long it takes the Board to act.”44
Conclusion
Although its application is rare, occasionally laches is successfully applied in administrative cases. There can be no doubt that time does not bar a sovereign entity when it is acting to protect the public. State government protects the public through medical and osteopathic boards. Therefore, the state boards are just one means for the government to exercise its sovereign authority. Thus, laches should not apply to state board administrative proceedings. The centuries-old axiom Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi — No Time Runs Against the King — should continue to be the rule.
References
- 1.↵I use the term state board to refer to both the boards of medicine and the osteopathic boards.
- 2.↵Fahmy v. Medical Bd. of California, 38 Cal.App.4th 810, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 486, 95 Cal, (Cal.App. 2 Dist., 1995), see also, Borror v. Department of Investment 15 Cal.App.3d 531, 540, 92 Cal.Rptr. 525, (Cal. App. 1971),, State v. Schaeffer, 129 Wis. 459, 109 N.W. 522, 525, (Wis. 1906)(A license revocation is not a punitive action but an action to protect the public).
- 3.↵Brown v. State Personnel Bd., 166 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1161, 213 Cal.Rptr. 53, 59, 24 Ed. Law Rep. 354 (Cal.App. 3 Dist., 1985), quoting, Wood v. Elling Corp. 20 Cal.3d 353, 362, 142 Cal.Rptr. 696, 572 P.2d 755 (Cal. 1977).
- 4.↵Lindsey v. Miller's Lessee, 31 U.S. 666, 8 L.Ed. 538, 1 Ohio F.Dec. 428 (1832).
- 5.↵Bash v. Board of Medical Practice, 579 A.2d 1145, 1152–53 (Del.Super.1989), see also, Applicability of statute of limitations or doctrine of laches to proceedings to revoke or suspend license to practice medicine, 51 A.L.R.4th 1147. State v. Josefsberg, 275 Wis. 142, 144, 150, 81 N.W. 2d 735 (Wis.Sup.Court, 1957).
- 6.↵Sahu v. Iowa Bd. of Medical Examiners, 537 N.W.2d 674 676, (Iowa, Sep 20, 1995), citing, 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 272, at 289 (1994), and Applicability of Statute of Limitations or Doctrine of Laches to Proceeding to Revoke or Suspend License to Practice Medicine, 51 A.L.R.4th 1147, 1151 (1987).
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.↵Stein v. State Psychology Examining Bd., 265 Wis.2d 781, 791, 668 N.W.2d 112, 117, 2003 WI App 147, (Wis.App., Jun 05, 2003), see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546–47, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985).
- 10.↵Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 508, 494 A.2d 270, 274, 51 A.L.R.4th 1129 (N.H., May 23, 1985), see Appeal of Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 122 N.H. 1062, 1072, 454 A.2d 435, 441 (N.H., 1982).
- 11.↵Id. at 509, 275.
- 12.↵See generally, Lake Havasu City v. Arizona Dept. of Health Services, 202 Ariz. 549, 48 P.3d 499, 376 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 28 (Ariz.App. Div. 1, Jun 25, 2002), U.S. v. Boccanfuso, 882 F.2d 666, 671, 30 ERC 1292, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,388 (Conn. 2nd Cir. Aug 09, 1989), Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 266, 106 S.Ct. 1834, 1842, 90 L.Ed.2d 248 (1986), Matter of Grossman v. Rankin, 43 N.Y.2d 493, 501, 402 N.Y.S.2d 373, 373 N.E.2d 267, (N.Y., 1979), see e.g., Watahomigie v. Ariz. Bd. of Water Quality Appeals, 181 Ariz. 20, 32, 887 P.2d 550, 562 (App. 1994)(quoting Hightower v. Duffy, 192 Ill.App.3d 65, 139 Ill.Dec. 110, 548 N.E.2d 495, 503 (Ill. 1989)), cf. Ariz. Libertarian Party v. Schmerl, 200 Ariz. 486, 500 ¶ 10, 28 P.3d 948, 952 (Ariz.App. 2001).
- 13.↵Fahmy v. Medical Bd. of California, 38 Cal.App.4th 810, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 486,(Cal.App. 2 Dist., Sep 26, 1995), citing, California Correctional Peace Officers assn v. State Personnel Board, 10 Cal.4th,1133,1150,43 Cal.Rptr. 693, 899 P.2d 79 (Cal. 1995).
- 14.↵Lake Havasu City v. Arizona Dept. of Health Services, 202 Ariz. 549, 48 P.3d 499, (Ariz.App. Div. 1, Jun 25, 2002), citing Traylor v. Thorneycroft, 134 Ariz. 482, 483, 657 P.2d 895, 896, (App. 1982) citing Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) 28-446(B), Id. at 484, 657 P.2d at 897, accord Brousseau v. Fitzgerald, 138 Ariz. 453, 456, 675 P.2d 713, 716 (Ariz. 1984)(“ten day requirement for action by the superior court is directory and not mandatory”), Forino v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 191 Ariz. 77, 81, 952 P.2d 315, 319 (App.1997)(failure to conduct hearing within statutory time did not divest agency of jurisdiction), Meyers v. Maul, 249 A.D.2d 796, 671 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (N.Y.A.D. 1998) (failure of state agency to issue determination within thirty days of hearing as required by statute did not divest agency of jurisdiction because statute was directory, to be mandatory, statute must contain “an express limitation upon the power of a particular agency to act after the expiration of the relevant statutory period”), Outdoor Resorts/Palm Springs Owners' Ass'n v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 224 Cal.App.3d 696, 273 Cal.Rptr. 748, 751 (Cal. App. 1990)(thirty-day limitation directory, and statutes or rules establishing time within which decision must be rendered directory “unless a consequence or penalty is provided for failure to do the act within the time commanded”), see generally Village of Mundelein v. Hartnett, 117 Ill.App.3d 1011, 73 Ill.Dec. 285, 454 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ill. 1983) (if statute mandatory, it prescribes result that will follow if required acts not done, if statute directory, then terms limited to what required to be done).
- 15.↵Idaho Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1400, 41 ERC 1207, 32 Fed.R.Serv.3d 774, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,265, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8746 (9th Cir.Idaho, Jun 29, 1995), citing Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 260–265, 106 S.Ct. 1834, 1839–1842, 90 L.Ed.2d 248 (1986).
- 16.↵Sierra Pacific Industries v. Lyng, 866 F.2d 1099, 1111, (9th Cir.Cal., Jan 25, 1989).
- 17.↵Freightways, Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 129 Ariz. 245, 247, 630 P.2d 541, 543 (Ari., 1981).
- 18.↵Brown v. State Personnel Bd., 166 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1158, 213 Cal.Rptr. 53, 58, 24 Ed. Law Rep. 354 (Cal.App. 3 Dist., 1985), quoting, Steen, 31 Cal.2d at 546–547, 190 P.2d 937.
- 19.↵Mt. San Antonio Community College Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 210 Cal.App.3d 178, 188, 258 Cal.Rptr. 302 (Cal.App., 1989). (Laches is an equitable defense which requires both unreasonable delay and prejudice resulting from the delay. The party asserting and seeking to benefit from the laches bar bears the burden of proof on these factors), See also, Bash v. Board of Medical Practice, 579 A.2d 1145, 1153, (Del.Super., 1989) (The party asserting laches bears the burden of proving both that the delay was unreasonable and that prejudice resulted from the delay), Conti v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners, 1 Cal.3d 351, 359, 82 Cal.Rptr. 337, 461 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1969), citing, Brown v. State Personnel Bd., 166 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1158, 213 Cal.Rptr. 53, 58, 24 Ed. Law Rep. 354 (Cal.App. 3 Dist., 1985) (In civil actions the “defense of laches requires unreasonable delay plus either acquiescence in the act about which plaintiff complains or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay), Caldwell v. State Bar, 13 Cal.3d 488, 496, 119 Cal.Rptr. 217, 531 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1975.), Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 Wis.2d 124, 159, 595 N.W.2d 423 (Wis. 1999), Stein v. State Psychology Examining Bd., 265 Wis.2d 781, 778–9, 668 N.W.2d 112, 115, 2003 WI App 147 (Wis.App. Jun 05, 2003).
- 20.↵Bash v. Board of Medical Practice, 579 A.2d 1145, 1152–53 (Del.Super. 1989), see, Mt. San Antonio Community College Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 210 Cal.App.3d 178, 258 Cal.Rptr. 302, 53 Ed. Law Rep. 192 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. May 05, 1989), Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center 27 Cal.3d 614, 624, 166 Cal.Rptr. 826, 614 P.2d 258 (Cal. 1980), California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Board 195 Cal. App.3d 285, 295–296, 240 Cal.Rptr. 549 (Cal.App., 1987), Santa Monica Mun. Employees Assn. v. City of Santa Monica 191 Cal.App.3d 1538, 237 Cal.Rptr. 185.) (Cal.App. 1987).
- 21.↵Brown v. State Personnel Bd., 166 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1158, 213 Cal.Rptr. 53, 58, 24 Ed. Law Rep. 354 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. Apr 16, 1985), citing Steen v. City of Los Angeles, 31 Cal.2d 542, 546, 190 P.2d 937 (Cal. 1948), c.f. Gates v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 94 Cal.App.3d 921, 924–925, 156 Cal.Rptr. 791 (Cal.App., 1979).
- 22.↵State v. Josefsberg, 275 Wis. 142, 144, 150, 81 N.W. 2d 735 (Wis. 1957), see, Wang v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 405 Mass. 15, 537 N.E.2d 1216, (Mass.1989), Cullen v. Building Inspector of N. Attleborough, 353 Mass. 671, 675, 234 N.E.2d 727 (Mass. 1968), Lincoln v. Giles, 317 Mass. 185, 187, 57 N.E.2d 554 (Mass. 1944), Schoenbach v. De Buono, 262 A.D.2d 820, 823, 692 N.Y.S.2d 208, (N.Y.A.D 1999) lv. denied 94 N.Y.2d 756, 703 N.Y.S.2d 73, 724 N.E.2d 769, Matter of Reddy v. State Bd. for Professional Med. Conduct, 259 A.D.2d 847, 848, 686 N.Y.S.2d 520, lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 813, 695 N.Y.S.2d 541, 717 N.E.2d 700, (N.Y.A.D. 1999), Pearl v. New York State Bd. for Professional Medical Conduct, 295 A.D.2d 764, 744 N.Y.S.2d 64, (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2002).
- 23.↵State ex rel. Webb v. West Virginia Bd. of Medicine, 203 W.Va. 234, 237, 506 S.E.2d 830, 833 (W.Va., Jul 16, 1998).
- 24.↵Green v. Board of Dental Examiners, 47 Cal.App.4th 786, 794, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 140, 144, (Cal.App. 2 Dist., Jun 18, 1996), see, Lam v. Bureau of Security & Investigative Services, 34 Cal.App.4th 29, 36, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 137 (Cal.App. 1995), Conti v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners, 1 Cal.3d 351, 359, 82 Cal.Rptr. 337, 461 P.2d 617, (Cal. 1969).
- 25.↵Brown v. State Personnel Board, 43 Cal.App.2d 70, 78, 110 P.2d 497 (Cal.App., 1941).
- 26.↵Brown v. State Personnel Bd., 166 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1158, 213 Cal.Rptr. 53, 58, 24 Ed. Law Rep. 354 (Cal.App. 3 Dist., Apr 16, 1985) (citation omitted).
- 27.↵Stebbins v. Department of Commerce,10 Or.App. 54, 499 P.2d 350 (Or. App. 1972).
- 28.↵Caldwell v. State Bar, 13 Cal.3d 488, 496, 119 Cal.Rptr. 217, 531 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1975).
- 29.↵Brown v. State Personnel Bd., 166 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1158, 213 Cal.Rptr. 53, 57–58, 24 Ed. Law Rep. 354 (Cal.App. 3 Dist., Apr 16, 1985), quoting Steen v. City of Los Angeles,31 Cal.2d 542, 546, 190 P.2d 937 (Cal., 1948).
- 30.↵Brown v. State Personnel Board, 43 Cal.App.2d 70, 78, 110 P.2d 497 (Cal.App. 1941).
- 31.↵Brown v. State Personnel Bd., 166 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1159, 213 Cal.Rptr.53, 58, (Cal.App. 3 Dist., 1985).
- 32.↵Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center, 27 Cal.3d 614, 624, 166 Cal.Rptr. 826, 614 P.2d 258 (Cal. 1980), Green v. Board of Dental Examiners, 47 Cal.App.4th 786, 792, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 140, 143, (Cal.App. 2 Dist., Jun 18, 1996), see also, Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 508, 494 A.2d 270, 274, 51 A.L.R.4th 1129 (N.H., May 23, 1985).
- 33.↵Brown v. State Personnel Bd., 166 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1161, 213 Cal.Rptr. 53, 60, 24 Ed. Law Rep. 354 (Cal.App. 3 Dist., Apr 16, 1985).
- 34.↵Sahu v. Iowa Bd. of Medical Examiners, 537 N.W.2d 674, (Iowa, Sep 20, 1995).
- 35.↵Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 99 1871 WL 14843, 20 L.Ed. 534, 13 Wall. 92, (1871), see, Fahmy v. Medical Bd. of California, 38 Cal.App.4th 810, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 486, 95 Cal., (Cal.App. 2 Dist., Sep 26, 1995), quoting, California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd., 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1150, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 693, 899 P.2d 79 (Cal. 1995).
- 36.↵Sahu v. Iowa Bd. of Medical Examiners, 537 N.W.2d 674, (Iowa, Sep 20, 1995), see e.g., State v. Josefsberg, 275 Wis. 142, 144, 150, 81 N.W. 2d 735 (Wis.Sup.Court, 1957), Wang v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 405 Mass. 15, 537 N.E.2d 1216, (Mass., 1989), May 04, 1989 Cullen v. Building Inspector of N. Attleborough, 353 Mass. 671, 675, 234 N.E.2d 727 (Mass. 1968), Lincoln v. Giles, 317 Mass. 185, 187, 57 N.E.2d 554 (Mass. 1944), Schoenbach v. De Buono, 262 A.D.2d 820, 823, 692 N.Y.S.2d 208, lv. denied 94 N.Y.2d 756, 703 N.Y.S.2d 73, 724 N.E.2d 769, (N.Y.A.D. N.Y. 1999), Matter of Reddy v. State Bd. for Professional Med. Conduct, 259 A.D.2d 847, 848, 686 N.Y.S.2d 520, lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 813, 695 N.Y.S.2d 541, 717 N.E.2d 700), Pearl v. New York State Bd. for Professional Medical Conduct, 295 A.D.2d 764, 744 N.Y.S.2d 64, (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.,2002).
- 37.↵U.S. v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 118 U.S. 120, 125, 6 S.Ct. 1006, 1008, 30 L.Ed. 81 (1886), see, U. S. v. Thompson, 98 U. S. 486, (1878), Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U. S. 272, 281, S. C. 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 325. (1882), Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92, (1871), U. S. v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301, 315 (1840).
- 38.↵Lake Havasu City v. Arizona Dept. of Health Services, 202 Ariz. 549, 48 P.3d 499, 376 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 28 (Ariz.App. Div. 1, Jun 25, 2002), citing, Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 262, 106 S.Ct. 1834, 90 L.Ed.2d 248 (1986) (Secretary of Labor did not lose power to recover misused Comprehensive Employment and Training Act funds following expiration of period for determining truth of allegations of wrongdoing), see also, N.L.R.B. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992).
- 39.↵Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 260 106 S.Ct. 1834, 1839, 90 L.Ed.2d 248, 54 USLW 4476 (U.S., May 19, 1986), quoting. United States v. Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co., 118 U.S. 120, 125, 6 S.Ct. 1006, 1008, 30 L.Ed. 81 (1886), see also, U. S. v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301, 315 (1840), Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 58 S.Ct. 785, 82 L.Ed. 1224 (1938), Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 515, 13 S.Ct. 418, 421, 37 L.Ed. 259 (1893).
- 40.↵Galang v. State Med. Examining Bd., 168 Wis.2d 695, 700, 484 N.W.2d 375 (Ct.App., 1992), See State v. MacIntyre, 41 Wis.2d 481, 484, 164 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1969) (addressing the primary purpose of attorney licensing/disbarment proceedings)..
- 41.↵Applicability of statute of limitations or doctrine of laches to proceedings to revoke or suspend license to practice medicine, 51 A.L.R.4th 1147.
- 42.
- 43.↵State ex rel. Webb v. West Virginia Bd. of Medicine, 203 W.Va. 234, 237, 506 S.E.2d 830, 833 (W.Va., Jul 16, 1998).
- 44.↵Fahmy v. Medical Bd. of California, 38 Cal.App.4th 810, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 486, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7536, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,898 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., Sep 26, 1995), see, Lake Havasu City v. Arizona Dept. of Health Services, 202 Ariz. 549, 48 P.3d 499, 376 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 28 (Ariz. App. Div. 1, Jun 25, 2002).
